Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 18
Issue 4 February

Article 7

Winter 1928

Prosecution in a Strike Case, A
Frank Swancara

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Frank Swancara, Prosecution in a Strike Case, A, 18 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 539 (1927-1928)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

A PROSECUTION IN A "STRIKE" CASE
FRANK SWANCARA'

In April, 1914, there was a strike in the coal fields of Southern
Colorado, and numerous breaches of the peace occurred, including
homicides. There was an alleged murder committed in the town of
Chandler, but as there were killings at other places, the event in
Chandler was not particularly noticed by writers of the time. Owing to the attendant circumstances, and subsequent developments,
this alleged murder and the prosecution arising therefrom is worthy
of discussion, particularly in these days when it is conventional to
complain of defects in the administration of our criminal law. This
article is not, however, a complaint. Neither is anything said herein.
intended to be a fault finding with any official or tribunal mentioned.
If it should appear to the reader that any such a one committed
error, in any sense of that term, let it be understood that he or it
acted honestly.
The facts hereinafter mentioned are gathered from the record
in the case discussed. While there was a strike prevailing in most
coal regions in southern Colorado, there was no strike at Chandler.
Consequently there were no strikebreakers or "scabs" in that camp.
Nevertheless there was, one day, a mob at Chandler, resembling the
fa~nous one of Herrin. It was not locally mobilized, but, like a
band of invading Huns, it came from other towns or camps. The
invaders came "to take Chandler," not to redress any wrong but, it
seems, simply because of circumstances and feelings arising from the
fact that the mine at Chandler was peacefully in operation with nonunion labor. The town was looted, many of its inhabitants were
assaulted, beaten and robbed; stores and buildings were burglarized.
William King, a respected and law abiding citizen of Chandler, was
killed by a bullet fired by some member of the attacking horde.
Countless crimes were committed on the occasion of that invasion, according to the testimony found in the record, a voluminous
record consisting of almost 5,000 folios. The store keeper was taken
to his own store and thrown through the panel of the door. A
hotel was broken into. The press and the periodicals did not give
much, if any, publicity to the outrages at Chandler. All this oc'Member of the Denver, Colo. bar.
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curred after the Ludlow incident, and our historians and writers
seem to have dealt with the strike situation only as far as the conclusion of the "Ludlow massacre," and the subsequent investigations
thereof.
Following the Chandler occurrences, criminal prosecutions were
instituted. Only one case, however, ever came to trial. Important
as this prosecution was, it was little known, and is scarcely remembered
today. The bar remembers chiefly another case, known as the "Lawson" case. In the Chandler case seven defendants were charged
with murder in the first degree. At the conclusion of the trial the
jury found two of them guilty of voluntary manslaughter. These
were sentenced to serve a term in the state penitentiary. The evidence against one of them was strong; as to the other not so great.
The latter was an official of a labor organization. He testified that
he only tried to stop the shooting.
A writ of error was sued out by the convicted parties, and execution of the sentence was stayed. In due time the abstract of the
record and the brief of the plaintiffs in error was filed. The same
was prepared by a vast array of able counsel; at least it was so
signed. Thereafter, within the time allowed for that purpose, the
Attorney General then in office and two assistant attorney generals
prepared, and on January 9, 1917, filed in the Supreme Court, an
able brief on behalf of the people, seeking an affirmance of the conviction. On April 13, 1917, the plaintiffs in error filed their reply
brief. The status of the case then was such that the reviewing court
could take it up and consider the errors assigned and argued. If
oral argument had been requested, the time for such argument could
have been set and the cause permitted to take the usual course.
Nothing further was heard of or concerning the case, by the
people or by the officers of the county where it had been tried, until
September 27, 1917. The news then received did not take the form
of a decision, or a determination of the case by the appellate court.
Instead, it was then learned that the succeeding Attorney General
had filed a Confession of Error. This new, or second, Attorney
General came into office shortly after his predecessor had filed the
brief in behalf of the people.
The filing of a confession of error in a criminal case pending
on writ of error was never, in the entire history of the state, a
common occurrence. It was unusual even with the officer who filed
the document in this case. Generally, the attorney general in question sought an affirmance of the judgment of conviction in criminal
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cases. As a rule, almost without exception, he did not file a confession of error even where there was error in the record. There
are many criminal cases on record where the supreme court of Colorado
reversed the judgment on account of errors in the record, in the
absence of any confession of error, during the term of office of this
attorney general as well as during the incumbency of his predecessors
and of his successors. Some of these cases are cited in the note
2
below.
A confession of error was filed, however, in almost every case
where the defendant was convicted of a crime alleged to have been
committed in the course of strike disturbances, and such confession
of error was filed after a former attorney general had filed a brief
in support of the conviction and sentence in at least two of such
cases. Lawson v. People, 63 Colo. 270, .165 Pac. 771; Richardson v.
People, 69 Colo. 155, 170 Pac. 189.
The Confession of Error filed September 27, 1917, in this "strike
case" involving the Chandler homicide, while it may have embraced
several assignments of error, confessed, ifi substance, but-two alleged
errors. One of these concerned an instruction to the jury, and the
other related to remarks of the trial judge.
As to the first. There was a count in the information upon
which plaintiffs in error had been tried ..which charged the specific
act of murder to some person unknown to the district attorney, and
then alleged that the defendants were then and there present, standing by, aiding, abetting and assisting such unknown person to commit the murder. The court instructed the jury that if defendants
"aided, abetted or assisted" the one actually guilty of murder in
the commission of such crime, they themselves were guilty of murder. The first alleged erfor confessed consisted in the failure ' of
the trial court to make the instruction more complete and instruct
further that the defendants must also be found to have known the
criminal intcnt of the person aided or abetted.
Spokesmen for labor unions have not hesitated to criticize, or
even to denounce, a federal judge who has issued an injunction in
a case involving a labor controversy. Perhaps they have said that
he was not only wrong, but also corrupt. At any rate the propriety
2

Judgment reversed in: Davidson v. People, 64 Colo. 281, 170 Pac. 962
(conspiracy, false pretenses) ; Aloynahan v,. People, 63 Colo. 433, 167 Pac. 1175
(receiving stolen goods); King v. People, 64 Colo. 398, 172 Pac. 8 (larceny);
DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 Pac. 359 (forgery) ; DePriestv. People, 64
Colo. 358, 171 Pac. 1004 (non-support) : Kilpatrirk v. People, 64 Colo. 209, 170

Pac. 956 (non-support); Eby v. People, 63 Colo. 276, 165 Pac. 765 (rape);
Perry v. People, 63 Colo. 60, 163 Pac. 844 (imurder).
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of the injunctions has been freely discussed. So it seems proper
to note the workings of legal machinery when the results were favorable to "union men."
If the confession of error had not been filed, the appellate court
might have held the instruction sufficient, since it was framed substantially in the language of the- statute (Section 6,645 C. L. 1921)
and was in form usually not objected to.
In 1 Randall's Instructions to Juries, section 314, it is said:
"An instruction which follows the language of the statute in defining
a principal or an accessory will ordinarily be sufficient, and usually it is
better to do so."
See also State v. Bland, 9 Idaho 796, 76 Pac. 780, and other cases
cited by the author.
Again, if the confession of error had not been filed, the appellate
court might have considered the failure of plaintiffs irl error to object to the instruction, and might have held the error waived. Again,
if the alleged error confessed was in fact an error, it may have been
a harmless error, or an error cured by verdict. The defendants were
not found guilty of murder in any degree whatever. The verdict
found them guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. At common law,
and under statutes declaratory thereof, there cannot be accessories
before the fact to voluntary manslaughter, which is a killing in the
heat of sudden passion and without malice (Section 6,666 C. L. 1921),
and is, therefore, inconsistent with the idea of premeditation. 29
C. J. 1,066, section 38. It may be that error in defining accessories
is harmless when the verdict is for voluntary manslaughter.
There should be no reason why in a labor case a minor error
is a more ominous scarecrow than it is in a liquor case, if it is. In
Gizewski v. People, 239 Pac. 1,026, a liquor case, the court quotes
from May v. People, 236 Pac. 1,022, as follows:
"Where one knowingly and willfully violates the law, and his guilt is
clearly proven, he cannot successfully rely for a reversal on technical
errors occurring during the trial."
It may be rightfully assumed that the question above mentioned
was presented in a motion for new trial, and that such motion was
argued. There is a probability that the trial judge was satisfied on
the hearing of such motion that no prejudicial error was committed.
Certainly the local prosecuting officers and the first attorney general
were so convinced. Who can say that the Supreme Court would
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have arrived at a different conclusion if it had considered that question ? The second alleged error confessed consisted of certain conduct on the part of the trial judge. No member of the bar ever
doubted the honesty, integrity and judicial ability of the judge in
question. The conduct complained of by plaintiffs in error consisted
of certain remarks of the judge. Most, if not all, of these were
made in connection with rulings on the admissibility of certain
evidence or the propriety of certain questions propounded to witnesses. The court, in its remarks, assumed that there was a conspiracy to invade the town of Chandler, and that the defendants were
"in that crowd" which came to the town. In the instructions to the
jury the trial court afterwards told the jury to disregard remarks
of either court 6r counsel made during the progress of the trial.
Certainly there is, or was, room for argument that the remarks did
not constitute reversible error in view of the instructions given.
The brief and argument of the first Attorney General sought
to show that there was no such conduct on the part of the trial judge
'as to warrant a reversal of the judgment. That brief contained
fifty-seven pages, ana concluded with the following statement:
"We conscientiously believe that the defendants here had a fair and
impartial trial and that the verdict of the jury should be affirmed by this
court."

After one Attorney General has filed a brief in support of a
conviction, especially in a case where a human life has been lost,
and the life of a good citizen at that, it seems strange that his successor in office would desire, in any case, and irrespective of his
own views, to file a confession of error and thus, in effect, strike
the brief of his predecessor from the files. Why was it done in this
case? The second Attorney General in the document filed by him
said:
This cause has now been set down for oral argument in
which we must either participate and endeavor to uphold the sentence of
the lower court, or decline to do so. Responsibility in the matter having
thus devolved upon us, we shall advise this Honorable Court of our own
conclusions in the premises irrespective of any action heretofore taken by
our predecessor in office.
"We have made a careful examination of the record. From such
investigation, we are convinced that there is such error in the record as
ought to result in the reversal of the judgment. We cannot, therefore, in
good conscience, contend for its affirmance .
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We do not know that the former Attorney General, or some
one of his assistants familiar with the case, would not appear and
participate in the oral argument on behalf of the state. No doubt
such former official would have been able "in good conscience" to
contend orally, as-he had in writing, for ahiaffirmance. The second
attorney general if unable to argue "in good conscience" in support
of the conviction, could have waived oral argument, allowing the
plaintiffs in error to make their argument without his replying thereto. He could have allowed the appellate court to consider the case
on the briefs theretofore filed on both sides and on the oral arguments not replied to, and thus let the court itself be the final arbite:
in the matter of alleged errors.
The District Attorney who prosecuted the case in the trial court
was not consulted as to his wishes, or those of the residents of the
county, regarding a confession of error, nor consulted in any manner for any purpose, by the second Attorney General.
The confession of error is signed by the second Attorney General alone. Usually in criminal cases pending on writ of error, the
work of his department is done by some assistant, and the brief
filed by the office is usually signed in the nalne of such assistant
as well as that of the Attorney General. It may be that if an assistant had been given this case in charge, he would not have filed
a confession of error, but would have contended for an affirmance
as in other cases, or have stood by the brief and argument of the
first Attorney General.
Of course, the murder case now under discussion did not end
automatically upon the filing of a confession of error, although the
outcome could then have been predicted. The Supreme Court still
had control of the same, and the power to dispose of it, including
the power to affirm the judgment, according to the practice announced
in. some jurisdictions. Oil Mill v. Coal Co. (Miss.), 91 So. 698.
It had the authority to ascertain whether the record supports the
allegations of the confession of eiror. Henderson v. State, (Okla.),
197 Pac. 720. It had the power and authority to consider the case,
and determine it, in the same way as if no confession of error had
been filed. State v. Stevens, 153 N. C. 604, 69 S. E. 11; State v.
Waite (Wash.), 238 Pac. 617."
The confession of error by the second attorney general was
filed September 27, 1917. If the court did not intend to consider
the case on its merits, nor examine the record, it might have disposed of it within a very short time. No announcement, however,
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came from the court until Jaunary 7, 1918. On that date the court
filed a memorandum in the case. The same may now be found tinder
the title "Richardson v. People," in 69 Colo. 155, or 170 Pac. 189,
and is in these words:
"Per Curiam.
"Plaintiffs in error were convicted of voluntary manslaughter and
sentenced to serve terms in the penitentiary. They have assigned and
argued numerous alleged errors occurring in the trial of the cause, which
they claim entitle them to a reversal of the judgment. The prosecution,
acting through the Attorney-General, has filed a confession of error and
asks for a reversal of the judgment. Under these circumstances, it is not
incumbent upon us to investigate the record and determine as to the correctness of his conclusions. We therefore reverse the judgment and
remand the cause."
It is an opinion "per curiam," which, according to 30 Cyc. 1,390,
indicates that all the judges were "of one mind," even as to the statement; "It is not incumbent upon us-to investigate the record."
This is probably the only reported case where
this court, or
any other court, reversed a judgment without indicating the errors
which ncessitated or caused the reversal, with the exception of Soto
v. People, 64 Colo. 528, 173 Pac. 399.
It is to be observed that there .is no statement or suggestion
in tle opinion or memorandum that the court paused to consider or
notice any of the errors assigned, or even any alleged error confessed. After watching Key Number 1,186 (6) in the American
Digest System, title "Criminal Law," for several years, and otherwise making a research concerning the points mentioned in this
paper, the writer feels inclined to assert that the Richardson and
Soto cases are without a precedent or a parallel.
In the course of a search, probably vain, for a similar opinion, one
would find that in Brasheers v. State (Okla.), 192 Pac. 433, the
court quoted the entire confession of error, thereby enabling counsel
and the trial court to ascertain the errors on account of which the
judgment was reversed. The opinions in other cases indicate that
the court examined the record for itself, and did not reverse the
judgment solely because a confession of error was filed. Henderson
v. State, supra; Green v. State, (Okla), 193 Pac 1,077; Scwake v.
State (Okla.), 198 Pac. 996; State v. Stevens, supra. In Bindrum
v. State (Okla.), 228 Pac. 168, the following is the syllabus by the
court:
"Where the Attorney General confesses error, this court will examine
the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded
in law, the conviction will be reversed."
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The same syllabus is given by the court in Raynter v. State
(Okla.), 228 Pac. 500, and a similar one in Tucker v. State (Fla.),
105 So. 140.
The court that prepared and filed the memorandum in the Richardson case, the subject of this article, said.in an earlier case (Lawson
v. People, supra), that where a former Attorney General has filed
a brief on behalf of the people, seeking to uphold a conviction, and
a second Attorney General later has filed a confession of error, it
is "the better practice to pass upon some of the assignments of error,
or one of them at least, upon which the (second) Attorney General
has confessed error." This particular "better practice" was applied
to Zancannelli v. People, 63 Colo. 252, 165 Pac. 612, where, according to the published report, a former Attorney General apparently
did not file a brief, but in the Richardson case, where such a brief
had been filed, the "better practice" was omitted.
In Sato v. People, supra, the supreme court, reversing a judgment in a criminal case in which a confession of error was filed,
said:
"The attorney general had presented a confession of error and asks a
reversal of the judgment.
"It is the uniform rule of this court in such cases to act affirmatively
upon such request of the attorney general. By the Constitution and statutes of this state the Attorney-General is the only person who is authorized by law to appear for the people, before the Supreme Court. The
duty and responsibility of the control of such cases are his.
"The judgment is reversed."
"The judgment is reversed."
From this opinion, or memorandum, it seems that the judgment
was reversed solely because a confession of error was filed, and
that such step was taken because the attorney general has "control"
of the case, and it is "the uniform rule" to act upon his- "request."
Thus there is ground for believing that the Richardson case was
reversed, not on account of errors, but because of a "request" of
the attorney general. If this is in accordance with a "uniform rule,"
then in most cases the fate of one convicted in a trial court is made
to depend, in some degree, on whether a "request" will be forthcoming in his case.
In Lawson v. People, supra, and in Zancannelli v. People, supra,
the court went further than to merely act on the request of the
Attorney General, and gave a reason for so doing. If there was
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error in the record in the Richardson case, the same procedure could
have been followed there.
The reason for acting on the "request" of the Attorney General
is, the court says, that he has "control" of the case. It has never
been held, however, outside of Colorado, that such control is so
great that he may even deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
case. Cases regarding "control" are collected in note 32, in 6 C. J.

816.
The "control" the Attorney General has, is precisely that control
which he possesses when he is contending for an affirmance of the
judgment, or the upholding of a sentence. It means that he, and
no one else, is authorized to appear for the state, and file motions
or briefs. No court would affirn a judgment solely because the Attorney General "requested" it. There is no control had by him
over the jurisdiction, judgment or action of the court. There is
no substantial reason why the court may not, in criminal cases, affirm
a judgment even where the Attorney General requests the contrary.
It has been held that in' civil cases there may be an affirmance notwithstanding a confession of error. Oil Mill Co. v. Coal Co. (Miss.),
91 So. 698. in a criminal case, the court in State v. Waite (Wash.),
238 Pac. 617, said:
"The attorneys, of course, know that we cannot affirm or reverse a
case simply because it'is stipulated that there is or is not error in the record."
But what is the situation if the attorneys happen to be residents
of Colorado?
In the Soto case, the Attorney General, to prove that he has
"control" of the case, cited State v. Fleming, 13 Iowa, 443. It is
safe to assume that the powers of the Attorney General are the same
in Iowa as they are in Colorado. But does the Iowa court reverse
a judgment in a criminal case solely because of a "request" of the
Attorney Gefieral? Not at all. In State v. Bailey, 85 Iowa, 713,
50 N. W. 561, it had before it such a request. It reversed the judgment, but the following was the reason given:
"As thel errors confessed appear to be prejudicial, the application to
docket the cause, reverse and remand it, will be granted."
Research fails to disclose a case in other jurisdictions where an
apellate court was confronted with a confession of error by a second
Attorney General after a former Attorney General had filed a brief
on behalf of the state. The confessions of error always appeared

548

FRANK SWANCARA

without a previous argument on behalf of the state. But even then,
the courts did not reverse the judgment solely because such a document appeared in the case. There was some examination of the record
by the court iself. In a recent gambling case Rush v. State (Okla.);
210 Pac. 316, the court said:
"This court concurs in the views expressed in the confession of error
by Attorney General."
There is a vast difference between the action of the Colorado
court in the Richardson case and that of the court in North Carolina
which, in State v. Stevens, supra, said:
"While the opinion of the state's attorney has much weight with us, it
is our practice to examine the record carefully ourselves before setting
aside a conviction for crime and directing another trial."
It appears that counsel for the defendants (in the Richardson
case) did not, at any time, expect that the case would terminate in
the manner in which it was disposed of. Notwithstanding the fact
that the first Attorney General went out of office, they began the
preparation of a brief in reply to the brief that had been filed on
behalf of the state. On Aliril 13, 1917, they filed a reply brief,
containing sixty-three printed pages.
Either they did not expect
a Confession of Error to be forthcoming, or else they doubted its
efficacy.
One who obtains all his information of the Richardson case solely
from the published report, will not regard the case either as serious
or important. From the court's opinion, all that appears regarding
the gravity of the crime charged, and the attendant facts, is the statement that defendants were "convicted of voluntary manslaughter."
Usually, when a defendant is informed against for murder in the first
degree, that fact appears in the published report, even where the
verdict is one finding the defendant guilty of "voluntary manslaughter"
-a situation illustrated in Moore v. People, 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 857.
The published report of the Richardson case makes no mention
of the first Attorney General, and it does not contain the name of
such Attorney General or the names of the two Assistant Attorneys
General who acted with him, in the space usually given to names of
attorneys appearing in a case. It could not be that the names of these
attorneys were kept off the report because they were out of office
at the time the opinion was filed. In other such cases their names
do appear, as in Lawson v. People, supra. In every other case the
name of every attorney appearing is published, whether he is acting
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at the time of the final decision or not. The suppression, or omission, of the names of the first Attorney General and his two assistants,
in the report of the Richardson case, makes it appear as if the second
Attorney General was the only individual that ever appeared on behalf of the people in the supreme court in that case. It also makes
it appear, or seem, that the court did not have before it, or in its
office, the brief of the first Attorney General. It makes it seem as if
nothing had ever been done on behalf of the people, in that court,
except the filing of the -confession 6f error.
In a great number of criminal cases, reviewed by appellate courts,
where the conviction was not set aside, counsel for the defense contended, in good faith, that there was glaring error in the record, but
the Attorney General was able, in good conscience, to contend for an
affirmance. Had he agreed with counsel for the accused, the result
might have been different. It is not the luck of the ordinary defendant
to have the Attorney General so agree. In Beeler v. People, 58 Colo.
451, 146 Pac. 762, the defendant killed, not a non-union workman,
but a "young Hereford steer." No confession of error was filed,
and not withstanding a faulty instruction, the judgment of conviction
was affirmed.
The trial of this "strike case" occupied nearly two months. No
labor or expense was spared on either side. A great array of counsel
was employed on behalf of the defense. The county employed a
special prosecutor to assist the district attorney. An assistant Attorney General also participated on behalf of the people. The District Attorney was present and in charge of the prosecution. The
magnitude of the task confronting either side, and the importance of
the trial, is made manifest by its length and by the number of witnesses
testifying. Fifty-nine witnesses were called by the people, and fiftyone by the defense.
Everyone thought that this trial was a serious business; everyone
believed that the verdict would be the sole factor upon which would
depend the ultimate fate of the defendants, or each of them, in respect
to incarceration in the penitentiary. No one anticipated that ultimately
there would be a summary reversal of the judgment by the supreme
court, in the event, of a conviction in the trial court.
As before noted, the reversal was one without an opinion, unless
the court's brief memorandum can be called an opinion. The memorandum did not point out any error at the trial. The reversal was
ordered in such summary manner as is ordinarily employed in disposing of some unimportant motion in an unimportant case. The
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reversal was ordered on nothing except the "request" of the Attorney
General then in office, if under the Soto case a confession of error
is to be deemed a "request," and then too, a request coming, as it
did, after a former Attorney General had filed a brief on behalf of
the people, contending, seriously and ably, for an affirmance of the
judgment and the conviction.
Announcement of the reversal in the Richardson case was made
by the supreme court on January 7, 1918. The reversal being ordered
on the request of the Attorney General, there would, of course, be
no petition for a rehearing filed by him. It would have been futile
for the special prosecutor who had been employed by the county
where the case was tried, or for the District Attorney, to have filed
a petition asking the Supreme Court to reconsider, or consider, the
case on its merits. In Soto v. People, supra, the court refused to
be influenced by the brief of the District Attorney which had been
filed even before the court reversed the case on a confession of error.
The Richardson case was never retried. It was reversed nearly
four years after the crime was committed, and more than three years
after thet trial. Probably the local officers believed that after the lapse
of such period of time, another verdict of guilty could not be obtained, or that if it could be, the result would not be worth the time
and labor necessarily involved in another trial. The expense too,
is appalling in such cases. The prosecution was dismissed, soon after
a new District Attorney went into office in that district.
William King was killed, and under circumstances which caused
the local officers of the law to believe that the killing was a murder.
A grand jury, during a long session, made diligent inquiry into the
facts attending the homicide, and presented indictments. The District Attorney, Gilbert A. Walker, did all in his power, as a prosecuting officer, to bring the guilty parties to justice. His oath of office
demanded that action of him, and good conscience would make it
imperative. The county authorities gave their earnest and active cooperation. Seven persons were finally brought to trial on a charge
of murder in the first degree, and conspiracy to murder. The jury
acquitted five of them, and found two guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
A motion for new trial having thereafter been overruled, the court
pronounced a sentence upon them, fixing a term in the state penitentiary. The Attorney General then in office and. two of his staff,
whose names appear in the official reports of other cases, including
Lawuson v. People, supra, but not in this case, did all in their power
to make the verdict of the jury stand and to have the judgment and
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conviction upheld in the appellate court. What happened thereafter
has been already detailed. The short memorandum of the supreme
court, in this case, is the climax in the story of the killing, probably
murder, of William King, as told by official records.
William King was only a non-union laboring man, living in the
obscurity which surrounds any one who makes his living by the sweat
of his brow. Consequently but few persons were much concerned
over bringing his assailants to justice. Nobody seemed to care, after
a while, what would become of the case. It may be that now the disintegrating bones of William King are lying in an unmarked grave,
the sod covered with noxious weeds and decaying grass. Further
reflections are left to the reader.

